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HOW A COURT BECOMES SUPREME: DEFENDING THE 
CONSTITUTION FROM UNCONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
RICHARD ALBERT 
ABSTRACT 
 High courts around the world have increasingly invalidated con-
stitutional amendments in defense of their view of democracy, an-
swering in the affirmative what was once a paradoxical question 
with no obvious answer: can a constitutional amendment be un-
constitutional?  In the United States, however, the Supreme Court 
has yet to articulate a theory or doctrine of unconstitutional con-
stitutional amendment.  Faced with a constitutional amendment 
that would challenge the liberal democratic values of American 
constitutionalism—for instance an amendment restricting political 
speech or establishing a national religion—the Court would be left 
without a strategy or vocabulary to protect the foundations of con-
stitutional democracy.  In this Article, I sketch eight strategies the 
Court could deploy in order to defend American constitutional de-
mocracy—and to make itself truly supreme by immunizing its judg-
ments from reversal by constitutional amendment. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today, two centuries after Marbury v. Madison,1 the United States Su-
preme Court has yet to become truly supreme.  There is more than meets the 
eye to Chief Justice John Marshall’s memorable assertion: “[i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”2  It is true that the power of constitutional review has become a significant 
source of judicial authority in the United States and indeed around the world, 
so much so that prominent scholars speak now less of democracy than ju-
ristocracy,3 the critique being that courts today intervene in an extraordinary 
range of questions that straddle the blurry but still conceptually valuable sep-
aration of law from politics.4  Marbury has migrated abroad, empowering 
courts to determine where the boundary rests between what is constitutional 
and what is not, and attracting charges of juristocracy where courts have as-
serted themselves as the true and only guardians of the Constitution.5 
Yet insofar as the juristocracy critique is rooted in a presupposition of 
the democratic deficit of courts, it misses an important point: the rulings of 
constitutional and supreme courts are by default often reversible by constitu-
tional amendment.  Amending actors ordinarily have the power to override a 
judicial opinion where they can gather the majorities needed to pass an 
amendment repealing the court decision.  In the United States, for example, 
amending actors have on several occasions amended the Constitution to over-
turn a judgment of the Supreme Court.6  The upshot is that courts are not truly 
                                                          
 1.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 2.  Id. at 177. 
 3.  For the most influential use and elaboration of this term, see RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS 
JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). 
 4.  See Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93 (2008). 
 5.  For a discussion of how Marbury has traveled the world, see Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial 
Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1017 (1970); Miguel Schor, Mapping Com-
parative Judicial Review, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 257 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Marbury 
v. Madison Around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 251 (2004). 
 6.  See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), superseded in part by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 
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supreme if their judgments are reversible by a constitutional amendment.  A 
court is truly supreme only if its rulings are irreversible. 
II.  DEFENDING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
A court therefore becomes supreme where its judgments are resistant to 
constitutional amendment—where what the court says really is final, where 
there are limits to the power of constitutional amendment, and where the 
court is the one to identify and enforce those limits. 
A.  Limitations on the Amendment Power 
If we look carefully around the world, we cannot deny as a descriptive 
matter that there are limits to the amendment power.  In countries far and 
near—from Argentina to Austria, Belize to Brazil, Greece to Hungary, India 
to Italy, Peru to Portugal, South Africa to Switzerland, Taiwan to Turkey—
high courts have with accelerating frequency adopted the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional constitutional amendment, authorizing themselves (sometimes in 
defiance of the constitutional text) to strike down an amendment for violating 
their reading of the constitution, whether on procedural or substantive 
grounds.7 
What has largely prompted courts to adopt this doctrine is the defense 
of democracy.8  Courts have invoked the doctrine to protect what they regard 
as the fundamental values of their constitutional democracy.9  In India, for 
example, the Supreme Court invalidated a constitutional amendment that, in 
the Court’s own view, would have undermined the separation of powers and 
violated the “basic structure” of the Constitution.10  In the Czech Republic, 
the Constitutional Court annulled an amendment that it determined would 
have changed “the essential requirements for a democratic state governed by 
the rule of law.”11  And in Belize, to give one final example, the Supreme 
                                                          
(1895), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  For 
another more complicated example still useful to illustrate the point, see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendments, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, 
XIV. 
 7.  See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and Suc-
cess of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 670–710 (2013). 
 8.  See Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
 9.  See Richard Albert, Amendment and Revision in the Unmaking of Constitutions, in 
EDWARD ELGAR HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION-MAKING 3–9 (David Landau & 
Hanna Lerner eds., forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2841110. 
 10.  See Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCR 206 (India). 
 11.  Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 09.10.2009 (US) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Sept. 10, 2009] sp.zn. PI. ÚS 27/09.  For a full English translation, see 2009/09/10-Pl. ÚS 27/09: 
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Court struck down an amendment that it believed would “destroy” the Con-
stitution’s foundational values of liberal democracy, namely the separation 
of powers.12  There are many examples in other jurisdictions of courts doing 
the same thing.13 
Two questions present themselves in connection with the United States 
Constitution: how many times has the Supreme Court invalidated a constitu-
tional amendment passed using Article V?; and what defenses are available 
in the Court’s own jurisprudence to combat an Article V amendment it deems 
contrary to constitutional democracy in the United States?  The answer to 
both is none.14  The Court has never invalidated a constitutional amendment 
passed under Article V, holding in two major cases—one challenging the 
Eighteenth Amendment and the other the Nineteenth—that the very fact that 
the amendment had been properly proposed and ratified under Article V was 
enough to insulate it from unconstitutionality.15  The Court has therefore re-
jected a substantive content-based approach to reviewing the constitutional-
ity of constitutional amendments and has instead taken a strictly procedural 
one: where an amendment conforms to the logistical requirements of Article 
V, the inquiry as to its constitutionality must end.16 
B.  The Corwin Amendment Then and Now 
No wonder, then, that the Corwin Amendment was once proposed in the 
United States, and could once again be lawfully introduced in Congress.17  
Originally proposed as the Thirteenth Amendment, the Corwin Amendment 
would have given states the unamendable right to maintain slavery, a protec-
tion worded innocuously as the freedom from congressional “interfere[nce]” 
                                                          
Constitutional Act on Shortening the Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies, § I, ÚSTAVNÍ  
SOUD, http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/20090910-pl-us-2709-constitutional-act-on-shortening-
the-term-of-office-of-the-chamber-of-de-1. 
 12.  See British Caribbean Bank Ltd. v. Attorney Gen. of Belize, Claim No. 597 of 2011, ¶ 45, 
http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/supreme_court/judgements/Le-
gal2012/EIGHTH%20AMENDMENT.pdf. 
 13.  See Aharon Barak, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISR. L. REV. 321 
(2011). 
 14.  I have explored elsewhere theoretical foundations of the lack of an unconstitutional con-
stitutional amendments doctrine in the United States.  See Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional 
Amendments, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 5, 15–21 (2009).  For the best study on the idea of an unconsti-
tutional constitutional amendment, see YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS (2017). 
 15.  See Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 
(1922). 
 16.  But the Court has invalidated constitutional amendments to state constitutions on substan-
tive grounds for violating the protections of the United States Constitution.  See Richard Albert, 
American Exceptionalism in Constitutional Amendment, 69 ARK. L. REV. 217, 242–46 (2016). 
 17.  See Richard Albert, Temporal Limitations in Constitutional Amendment, 21 REV. CONST. 
STUD. 37, 45–46 (2016). 
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into their “domestic institutions.”18  The full amendment, introduced in Con-
gress in 1861, reads: “No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which 
will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within 
any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons 
held to labor or service by the laws of said State.”19 
The House of Representatives approved the proposal by a vote of 133 
to 65, the Senate voted in its favor by a margin of 24 to 12, President James 
Buchanan signed it even though the Constitution gives the president no for-
mal role in constitutional amendment, and the new President Abraham Lin-
coln endorsed the amendment proposal in his inaugural address.20  Three 
states later ratified the amendment: Ohio in May 1861, Maryland in January 
1862, and Illinois in February 1862.21  By then, however, the Civil War had 
erupted, and in a twist of fate the amendment that was ultimately ratified as 
the Thirteenth Amendment accomplished the very opposite of what the Cor-
win Amendment had been designed to do: it formally abolished slavery. 
Is a Corwin Amendment possible today?  Unlike many Constitutions in 
the world, the United States Constitution does not entrench any current form 
of unamendability, so nothing is formally off limits to amending actors.  Any 
amendment may be proposed by amending actors, and indeed the kinds of 
amendments proposed in American history prove the point that anything is 
fair game.  For example, amendments have been proposed to forbid interra-
cial marriage,22 to ban flag desecration,23 and to reverse the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Roe v. Wade24 and Engel v. Vitale,25 the former protecting abor-
tion,26 and the latter prohibiting prayer in schools.27  Another proposed 
amendment would have limited marriage to two persons of the opposite sex.28 
                                                          
 18.  Id. at 45. 
 19.  H.R. Res. 80, 36th Cong., 12 Stat. 251 (1861). 
 20.  See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO 
MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 90–91 (1993). 
 21.  JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–2002, at 118 (2d ed. 2003). 
 22.  See PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE 
MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA 166 (2009). 
 23.  See Carl Hulse & John Holusha, Amendment on Flag Burning Fails by One Vote in Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/washington/27cnd-flag.html. 
 24.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 25.  370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 26.  See MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 41–42 
(2015). 
 27.  Reagan Proposes School Prayer Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 1982), http://www.ny-
times.com/1982/05/18/us/reagan-proposes-school-prayer-amendment.html. 
 28.  See Laurie Kellman, Gay Marriage Ban Falls Short of Majority, WASH. POST (June 7, 
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2006/06/07/AR2006060700929.html. 
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III.  A JUDICIAL STRATEGY TO PROTECT CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
One possibility for protecting the liberal democratic values of American 
constitutional democracy is to authorize courts to review the substance of 
constitutional amendments.  Yet because the Supreme Court has historically 
rejected the idea that a constitutional amendment can be unconstitutional on 
account of its content, the Court does not have a strategy or vocabulary to 
invalidate a constitutional amendment that, in the Court’s view, would at 
worst break or at best undermine the liberal democratic foundations of con-
stitutional democracy in the United States.  The question, then, is this: how 
have courts around the world exercised the power of constitutional review of 
constitutional amendments?  What strategies, doctrines, theories, and ap-
proaches have courts deployed to assert the power to declare a constitutional 
amendment unconstitutional?  Stated differently, though perhaps more di-
rectly, how does a court finally become supreme?29 
The rich jurisprudence of courts across the globe suggest eight strategies 
the Supreme Court could deploy to defend American constitutional democ-
racy—and by implication to make itself truly supreme by immunizing its 
judgments from reversal by constitutional amendment.30  Some strategies re-
late to how to monitor the process of constitutional amendment, others to 
evaluate the substance of a constitutional amendment, and still others relate 
to non-constitutional strategies to protect the Constitution from attacks to its 
foundations.  What follows, then, is a roadmap for courts principally in the 
United States—though also elsewhere—to become supreme in more than 
name alone, in jurisdictions where the doctrine of unconstitutional constitu-
tional amendment does not yet exist. 
A.  Procedural Unconstitutionality 
One set of strategies is aimed at enforcing the constitutionally mandated 
procedures for formal amendment.  There are three possible procedural vio-
lations. 
First, an amendment can be ruled unconstitutional because it was made 
using the wrong procedure.  Some constitutions—for instance South Af-
rica’s—entrench multiple procedures for constitutional amendment, and each 
                                                          
 29.  For the best normative defense of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amend-
ment, see Yaniv Roznai, Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty: Linking 
Unamendability and Amendment Procedures, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 23 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2017). 
 30.  I have explored this question in connection with the Constitution of Canada.  See Richard 
Albert, The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 41 
QUEEN’S L.J. 143 (2015). 
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is keyed to a specific set of provisions or principles,31 meaning that one pro-
cedure cannot be used to amend a provision that is expressly made amendable 
by another procedure.  Courts could invalidate an amendment for having been 
passed using the wrong procedure.  We can call this a subject-rule mismatch.  
In the United States, for instance, Article V requires a state to consent to a 
diminution of its representation in the Senate.32  If amending actors reduced 
Rhode Island’s senatorial delegation from two to one without getting the 
State’s consent, the Court could invalidate the amendment as procedurally 
unconstitutional. 
Second, some constitutions impose a time limit for passing a constitu-
tional amendment.33  For instance, the Australian and Italian Constitutions 
require that an amendment must be debated for a certain period of time before 
a ratifying vote.34  Part of the reasoning for imposing a time limit for ratifi-
cation is contemporaneity: amending actors should discuss the same question 
under the same societal and political conditions within the same period of 
time because only this way can we be certain that a successful amendment 
has the support of a contemporaneous majority of amending actors.  Without 
a time limit for ratification, the extraordinary delay between the original pro-
posal and final ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the United 
States Constitution becomes possible: the amendment was originally pro-
posed in 1789 and finally ratified over two centuries later in 1992.35  Alt-
hough the Supreme Court of the United States has deferred to Congress on 
the question whether an amendment has been ratified sufficiently contempo-
raneously to its proposal—the Court held that ratification must occur in a 
“reasonable” period of time after proposal, but that what is “reasonable” must 
be determined by Congress36—the Court could invalidate an amendment for 
taking too long between proposal and ratification on the theory that democ-
racy requires an implicit time limit for ratifying a constitutional amendment, 
even where the constitutional text imposes none. 
The third procedural basis for invalidating a constitutional amendment 
is a processual irregularity of some sort.  Perhaps the vote was somehow 
                                                          
 31.  See S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
 32.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 33.  See Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 913, 952–54 (2014). 
 34.  See, e.g., Australian Constitution s 128 (requiring a referendum no longer than six months 
after Parliament approves proposal); Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (requiring debate of at least 
three months).  
 35.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of 
the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1993). 
 36.  Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921) (holding that ratification must occur “within 
some reasonable time after the proposal”); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939) 
(holding that Congress must determine what is reasonable in the interval between proposal and 
ratification). 
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rigged or unfair, or perhaps the voting machines were broken or hacked, or 
perhaps there was voter suppression or some other challenge that amounts to 
a non-trivial obstacle to casting one’s vote on the amendment, whether for 
instance as a legislator in a parliament or as a voter participating in a refer-
endum.  The Supreme Court could peer behind the official results of the 
amendment vote to interrogate the vote itself.  Where the Court finds evi-
dence of a processual irregularity, it could invalidate that amendment. 
B.  Content-Based Unconstitutionality 
Another set of strategies for invalidating a constitutional amendment is 
aimed at evaluating the content of the amendment and its conformity with the 
existing Constitution.  In contrast to a processual irregularity, which concerns 
how an amendment is passed, content-based review involves what precisely 
the amendment is about.  Here too there are three possibilities for an uncon-
stitutional constitutional amendment. 
The first relates to what we might identify as the founding principles of 
a constitution.  A constitutional amendment might violate an important prin-
ciple deemed constitutive of the Constitution itself.  We can trace this idea to 
the German Federal Constitutional Court.  In a judgment early in its existence 
in 1951, the Court adopted the reasoning of the Bavarian Constitutional 
Court: 
That a constitutional provision itself may be null and void is not 
conceptually impossible just because it is a part of the Constitution.  
There are constitutional principles that are so fundamental and so 
much an expression of a law that has precedence even over the 
Constitution that they also bind the framers of the Constitution, and 
other constitutional provisions that do not rank so high may be null 
and void because they contravene these principles.37 
The Supreme Court of the United States could take this route, striking 
down an amendment for breaching one or more principles the Court identifies 
as fundamentally rooted in the founding moment.  An example might be the 
founding non-establishment norm that makes it unacceptable for amending 
actors to pass a constitutional amendment establishing a national religion. 
The second strategy under these content-based defenses against an un-
constitutional constitutional amendment is to interpret a Constitution as an-
chored in an evolved norm that may not have been evident at the founding, 
but that the judiciary has over the course of developing its jurisprudence iden-
tified as a special norm that sits at the apex of the constitutional order.  A 
                                                          
 37.  KEMAL GÖZLER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 85 (2008) (quoting COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
COMMENTARIES 659–65 (Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus eds. and trans., 1977)). 
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constitutional amendment to ban flag burning in the United States, for exam-
ple, could be held unconstitutional for violating the norm of wide latitude for 
political speech, currently the most strongly protected form of speech under 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law.38 
The third strategy under these content-based defenses against an uncon-
stitutional constitutional amendment is to define an amendment as a new 
Constitution in disguise.  All constitutions have an internal architecture, and 
changes made to their architectural core amount to more than mere amend-
ments.  This was the theory underlying the Indian Supreme Court’s idea of 
the “basic structure doctrine,” which the Court created to protect the Consti-
tution from revolutionary transformations made with recourse to the simple 
rules of constitutional amendment.39  In a leading case, the Indian Chief Jus-
tice wrote that amendments were permissible in all cases provided that “in 
the result the basic foundation and structure of the Constitution remains the 
same.”40  A similar approach could be taken in the United States where, for 
instance, a constitutional amendment purported to transform the system of 
government from a presidential to a parliamentary one.  Such a change would 
amount to considerably more than we expect of a constitutional amendment.  
The Supreme Court might therefore conclude that this was a new Constitu-
tion masquerading as an amendment. 
C.  Notional Forms of Unconstitutionality 
There is a third category of unconstitutionality, more notional than con-
ventional, but nevertheless a source of useful judicial tools to defend the 
foundational values of American constitutional democracy from an unconsti-
tutional constitutional amendment.  This category contains two strategies, 
each of a more recent vintage than the others described above. 
                                                          
 38.  See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Speech is an 
essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. . . . 
The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a 
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.” (citation omitted) 
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976))); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 
886, 913 (1982) (“This Court has recognized that expression on public issues ‘has always rested on 
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’ . . . ‘[S]peech concerning public af-
fairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.’ . . . There is a ‘profound 
national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); then 
quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964); and then quoting New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever 
differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of govern-
mental affairs.”). 
 39.  See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 36 SCR 1, 4 (India). 
 40.  Id. at 165. 
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In the first of these two strategies, the Supreme Court could find that a 
constitutional amendment is unconstitutional when measured against an un-
written constitutional norm.  Neither entrenched in the constitutional text nor 
the result of the Court’s jurisprudence, an unwritten constitutional norm un-
derpins the constitutional order and allows it to operate the way it does.41  An 
example of an unwritten constitutional norm in the United States may be the 
unwritten rule against court packing.42  Common law courts do not ordinarily 
enforce unwritten constitutional norms because they are creatures of politics, 
not of law, as the Canadian Supreme Court explained in its Patriation Refer-
ence on the degree of provincial consent required to make a major change to 
the Constitution.43  Nonetheless, a court could depart from this common prac-
tice, choosing to enforce a convention as a rule that binds amending actors 
when they undertake to amend the Constitution. 
The second of these strategies involves supra-constitutional law: where 
a country is a member of an international organization that has a charter of 
rules or practices, there may also be an adjudicatory body responsible for 
enforcing those rules and practices.44  In the case of a signatory country 
amending its Constitution in violation of this international charter, the adju-
dicatory body could find the amendment in conflict and therefore incompat-
ible.  Constitutional amendments in Nicaragua in 2004 and Togo in 2005 
were held to violate the rules of regional multinational organizations.45  In 
the United States, the Supreme Court could conceivably find a constitutional 
amendment unconstitutional where the amendment is held by an international 
organization to violate the rules or practices of a charter to which the United 
States is a signatory. 
All of these strategies are possible on the level of theory.  In reality, 
though, the particular configuration of constitutional politics in a given coun-
try could preclude their use. 
                                                          
 41.  For a discussion of how unwritten constitutional norms interact with codified constitutions, 
see Richard Albert, How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitutions, 38 
DUBLIN U. L.J. 387 (2015). 
 42.  See Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers, 32 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 
421, 424–25 (2012). 
 43.  Reference re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 759, 880, 904–
05 (Can.) (holding, in an advisory ruling known as the “Patriation Reference,” that a “substantial 
degree of provincial consent” was required to formalize the patriation—or in other words the do-
mestication—of the Constitution to Canada away from the legal authority of the United Kingdom). 
 44.  For an important discussion of this possibility, with insightful examples and enlightening 
analysis, see Yaniv Roznai, The Theory and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitu-
tional Amendments, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557 (2013). 
 45.  See Stephen J. Schnably, Emerging International Law Constraints on Constitutional Struc-
ture and Revision: A Preliminary Appraisal, 62. U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 461–79 (2008). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION—DOES THE UNITED STATES REALLY NEED A TRULY 
SUPREME COURT? 
The doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment can be useful 
in the defense of constitutional democracy but it is susceptible to misappli-
cation, just as any other judicial doctrine.  It can also be a superfluous device 
in the arsenal of defenses to attacks on liberal constitutionalism.  The doctrine 
is most important in countries where the Constitution may be easily amended, 
as in India, whose Constitution is in most cases amendable by a simple leg-
islative majority.46  In contexts like these, courts can serve as a check on bare 
legislative majorities that might exploit the permissive rules of constitutional 
amendment to make transformative constitutional changes without sufficient 
deliberation or popular support.  This is the strongest justification for the doc-
trine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment, if indeed there is one, 
given that the doctrine does raise questions about its democratic legitimacy. 
In the United States, the extraordinary difficulty of formal amendment 
may obviate the need for the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment.  Empirical studies have confirmed that the Constitution is one 
of the world’s most difficult, if not the most difficult, to amend.47  An amend-
ment proposal must survive a gauntlet of multiple veto gates in order to be-
come entrenched in the Constitution.  In the process, the amendment proposal 
is subjected to intense scrutiny in Congress, in state legislatures or conven-
tions, and in the public square more generally.  This is the kind of serious 
scrutiny that may make it unnecessary for the amendment to undergo subse-
quent judicial review.  Not only could judicial review of constitutional 
amendments in the United States amount to excessive review, but the very 
thought that a court could invalidate a duly passed constitutional amendment 
would shake the popular sovereigntist foundations of the Constitution itself. 
                                                          
 46.  See INDIA CONST. art. 368(2). 
 47.  See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 220 (1999); DONALD S. LUTZ, 
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 170 (2006); Astrid Lorenz, How to Measure Constitu-
tional Rigidity, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL. 339, 358–59 (2005).  For a critique of studies of formal 
amendment difficulty, see Richard Albert, The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 
53 ALTA. L. REV. 85 (2015) and Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amend-
ment Rule Matter at All?: Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Dif-
ficulty, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 686 (2015). 
